Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses

Theses and Dissertations

1937

The One and the Many
W. E. Powers
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses
Part of the History of Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Powers, W. E., "The One and the Many" (1937). Master's Theses. 577.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/577

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1937 W. E. Powers

J!i".

""58

THE ONE AND THE MANY
With Special Attention to the

Doc~rine

of Participation

in the Philosophy of Proclus
by

...

W. E. Powers

.,'

.,

A thesis submitted in partial
fulfillmentof the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts in
Loyola University, February, 1937.

F"

--------------------~------------------,

.'

William Emmett Powers, born
Milford Center, Ohio.

Febr~ary

22, 1890 at

He obtained his secondary

education at Hilliards, Ohio, and received B.A.
degree in 1930 from McMaster University, Toronto;
B.D. degree in 1933 and D.Theol. in 1935 from
the Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, Chicago.

~-------------------------------.

CONTENTS
Page

........

I. Introduction ••• - .• II. The Method ...

w

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

1

4

III. Sketch of His System ••.••.•••. , ..............• 10

IV. The Doctrine of Participation ••••.•..........• 28
V. Summary and Evaluation ••••••••••••••••••••. ~ •• 58

REFERENCES. • • • • • • • • . • • • • . •. • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • ••

63

BIBLIOGRAPHY. • • • • • • • • • . • . . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •• 67

THE ONE AND THE MANY

Wi th Special Attention to the Doctrine of Participa.'ion
in the Philosophy of Proclus
CHAPTER I
IN'TRODUCTIQ&
One need make no apology for writing a graduate
thesis on the system of Proclus.

He

w~s

one of the greatest

of the Neo-Platonists as well as the last of the great Greek
thinkers.
Proclus was not only a great commentator on the
doctrine of Plato, but displayed great originality and also
fil~ed

in many gaps in the philosophy of his most illustrious

predecessor Plotinus.

He is considered the greatest systema-

tizer between Aristotle and Thomas Acquinas.
There,is urgent need in our day for a revival of
the discursive and dialectic method, for acute logical
reasoning, and for a reinstatement of metaphysics to its proper
place in the pantheon of modern philosophy.

Whittaker very

wisely says,
"If too much method is at last fatal to progress,
too little means intellectual anarchy --- for
the modern anarchy of endless specialism is an
anarchy without liberty. It means Ghat industrialism has led science captive. A renewed
sense of wholeness is atlthe same time a renewed sense of freedom."

.

The modern craze for specialization, which never
deals with more than the parts, has been a disappointment in

the field of philosophy.

It will be refreshing to deal with

.'

Proclus from the sheer fact that he at least endeavors to
present an all comprehensive and systematic explanation of the
universe.
The plan of this dissertation will be to set forth
with enough detail the method of the.p&ocedure of Plotinus and
Proclus, (the method of each being substantially the same) by
It will
,.
be necessary to do this first because the entire superstructure

which they came to their interpretation of the cosmos.

of the system of Proclus depends on it.
Next a general sketch of the system will be presented
in sufficient detail to clarify his general schematization.
This may seem but a repetition of what is already well known,
and may be found in many books, but Proclus has made enough important innovations into the philosophy of Plotinus to warrant
a statement of his system, and the new elements or distinctive
features of his system will be emphasized.
The third and perhaps the most important part of the
whole thesis, will be an attempt to trace the relation of the
One and the Many with an especial effort to determine what
Proclus means by his doctrine of participation.

Participation

.

is a much uS'ed term and still remains somewhat vague and illusive.

It was not at all clear in the philosophy of Plato.

If some contribution can be made toward a clearer understanding
of this doctrine and determining of its meaning, the author
will feel amply repaid for his efforts.
As a last section. a summary of the salient points

and an evaluation of the contribution of Proclus will be made.

.'

The outline in general is:
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.

Introduction
The Method
Sketch of His System
The Doctrine of

ParticipatiQri~

Summary and Evaluation.
Of the works used and

referr~

to in this thesis the

most important of the primary sources are:
The Elements of Theology - translated by Dodds.
Three Short Treatises on Providence, Fate and Evil translated by T. Taylor.
Fragments of Lost Writings of Proclus - translated by
T. Taylor.
Proclus' Commentaries on the Alcibiades, the Timaeus,
the Parmenides and the Republic.
An English Translation by Taylor.
(This edition is
out of print and can only be had at the
Newberry Library, therefore the references in
this thesis will be to the Latin translation
edited by Cousin, Paris 1804.
The Enneads of Plotinus - translated by T. Taylor.
The secondary sources are:
The Comrnents of Dodds on The Elements of Theology.
The Neo-PlatonIsts by Whittaker.
The Philosophy of Plotinus by lnge.
These are the more important ones.
bibliography.

Others will appear in the

CHAPTER II
THE METHOD
The ·method of Proclus, as well as that of most of the
Neo-Platonists,
jectivism.

1s psychological

Since man is a

~nd

therefore based in sub-

microcosm~'~owledge

world are necessarily correlated.

of man and the

Therefore a study of man is

the first step to an interpretation of the universe.

For

Proclus the One or God can be apprehen!ed as the cause by the
principle of mind itself.

The Being of which the universe is a

manifestation can only be understood by mind in its explicit
activity.2
In his process of introspection he found the soul to
be not only unitary but also manifold; ana so he divides its
activities into intuitive thought, reason or understanding,
opinion and sense perception.

To judge belongs to the soul as

a unity and the common power of judgment is discursive reason.
Again by introspection he contrasts the soul or thinking subject with thought.

He also thinks of the universe in the same

manner, that is, the One which animates through a series of
causes must also be transcendent and thought of as in contrast
to the universe.

By its outgoing powers the soul animates the

entire body but by introspective processes it remains always
beyond the limits of the body.

The soul has power to think

and finds itself to be all things.

On this point Whittaker

says,
"Since man is a microcosm, knowledge of man and of

~

"the world are necessarily correlated. As God or
the One can only be apprehended as the cause by
the principle itself of the mind, so the Being of
which the universe is a manifestation can only be .'
understood by mind in its explicit activity. To
place the theory of thinking beside the theory of
the object of thought is declared to be a
Pythagorean point of view. This meant what we
now call an idealistic position. The remark has
special relevance because the historigal Timaeus
was said to have been a PythagQ;J'~.n
It is thought by a great many writers that Plato sets
out from a theory of knowledge which begins not by examining
things but by asking what the mind ~an lnow.

To learn the

meaning of being and becoming, we must discover in what way
each is known.

The soul is not only unitary but it is also

manifold, and there is a place for unity of thought, for reason
or understanding, for opinion and for sense perception.
Proclus the power of judgment is discursive reason.

For

At one ex-

treme the human mind may grasp by intellectual intuition and at
the other it may comprehend by sense exp&rience.

Since both of

these philosophers are substantially the same in this psycho- ~
logical procedure, ~t will be much easier to sta~e the process
from the EnneadS 4 of Plotinus which deal with his psychology.
The fact that he has an entire section on psychology and its
relation to the cosmos, coupled with the above statements from
Proclus, warrant the statement that the two are in this par•

ticular in sUbstantial agreement.

It will be much easier to

give the psychological presentation of Plotinus inasmuch as he
has much more clearly and specifically set it forth in his
section on psychology, rather than cull here and there the
statements of Proclus.

He starts by insisting. on the paradoxical character

.'

of the soul's existence as contrasted with that of corporeal
things.

Body can be seen and touched and spread in space and

time, while soul is invisible, intelligible, and by definition
unextended.

Soul cannot be described at all except by phrases

which would be nonsensical if

applie~~o

body or its qualities,

or to determinations of particular bodies.

Body, once the soul

is admitted and defined, can be described in terms of soul but

•

not so vice versa.

With this broad statement he proceeds to

find within tile soul all the metaphysical principles of the
universe in some way represented.

Among these principles are

included that of unity, of pure intellect, of moving and vitalizing power, and in some sense matter itself. 5
The soul has not the characters of the thing possessing

qua~ity.

decrease.

It is not subject to quantitative increase or

The unity 1n perception would be impossible if that

which perceives consisted of parts spatially separated.

The

best that could be attained, if the perceiving subJect consisted
of spatially separated parts, would be a sort of transmitting
of impressions from part to part.

No such physical trans-

mission or succession of impressions could be because of the
very nature of material man which consists of parts each
standing by itself, one part having no knowledge
suffered in another.
this.

of what is

The feeling of pain is a good example of

We must assume a percipient which is everywhere

with itself.

identica~

Such a perCipient must be another kind than body

and that which thinks is still less body than that which

perceives.

Therefore, the thinking or rational soul is of ne-

cessity of different order of being than body.

The soul can

."

and does apprehend things which have no magnitude and which do
not require the use of bodily organs for their apprehension.
Such are the abstract conceptions of the beautiful and the just
That which is magnitude could not, tbe&efore, think that which
is not magnitude.

That which thinks must not be the body.

The

thinking subject cannot be body for the body nas no function as
an extended whole (and to be such is

its

nature as body,) since

it cannot as a whole come in contact with an object that is incorporeal.

6

According to Plotinus it is thus indivisible as

he makes the statement "All in all and all and all in every
part.,,7

This is also substantially the thought of Proclus.

This is the soul's relation to body.

Its unity is unlike that

of the body which is one by spatial continuity, having different parts each in a different place; and is also unlike that of
.
a quality of the body, such as color, which can be wholly in ,...
many discontinuous bodies.
not numerical.

The identity of soul is formal and

Pushing the quest for unity still further, the

Neo-Platonist holds that above perception is reason which has
no physical organ at all.

A sort of judgment is allowed to

perception.
Both perception and memory are energies or activities
not mere passive impressions received and stored up in the
soul.

In the perception of sight, for example, the thinking

subject directs the vision to the object in order to perceive
it more clearly.

This outward direction would not be necessary

if passive impressions were only rec'eived.

The soul has power

to read, as it were, these impressions and interpret them.

Im-

.,'

pressions are .one thing and the interpretations and judgmtmts
of them are another.

Memory of things is produced by the soul.

If memory were simply the mere multitude of perceptions then
there would not be any fading of memQrx.

It would not be neces-

sary to consider or think in order to be reminded of anything
if memory were only a.store of impressions.
things be forgotten and recalled again~
ception, though

itsel~

that memory has not.

mental, has

di~ect

Neither could

The activity of perphysical conditions

Memory itself is wholly of the soul though

it may take its start from what may go on in the composite
being.

The soul directly preserves the memory of its own

movements and not those of the body.

The body furnishes no ex-

planation of the storing-up of mental impressions which are not
magnitudes.

It is often a hindrance to memory by its addition

of impressions, as memory is based and emerges most clearly
abstraction and pure reasoning.

i~

Something of the distant past,

which is latent, can best be recalled when the impressions of
the moment are removed.

Memory, as well as the reason, belong

to the separable part of man, the soul.

.

Again the soul can objectify its content and separate itself from thought.

To this quest of consciousness and

self-consciousness, Plotinus and Proclus have contributed
greatly and cleared the matter to a considerable degree more
than any of their Greek predecessors.

They used the term

(-p;;..pa../(l)j()iJ fii;y &LciT@ ), accompaniment of one's self, or
;

the synthesis or unitary activity of the soul in reference
its contents.

This is not, however, the highest «nity ac-

cording to these two philosophers.

The highest mode of sub

Jective life next. to complete unification, in which even
thought disappears, is

.

intellec~ual
;;,

self-knowledge.

the knower is identical with the known.
and feeling is a decided hindrance to it.
one's self and still remain a se.f.
the inseparable.

In thi

This is beyond fee

One cannot objec

That would be to separ

Then as he drives his quest further he fi

at the center of the mind a unity which is beyond even self
knowledge.
things and

This is one with the metaphysical cause of all
i~

the proof of its reality in the metaphysical.

Upon this psychological unfolding of the microcos
which.he finds in man, it is possible to proceed to a state
ment of his in metaphysics.

This statement, however, rever

the order and starts with the One as ultimate unity.

CHAPTER III
A SKETCH OF THE SYSTEM
Inasmuch as the philosophy of Proclus is a system,
any approach to an understanding of

~t~must

necessarily begin

at the highest order of being or at the lowest.
of this tnesis will be the former.

The approach

Probably one of the best

·a
statements of his scale of being and becoming
is that of Dodds.
(/
.
"fOEV, which is uncaused, has maximal unity.
v
TD 6v, which is caused by7if. ~Y has unity and
(
maximal being.
~wrl which is caused by7'd' EY andr.;'~", has
unity, being and maximal life.
Vo(Js, which is caused by~~" ,76' 'tY' , and",wI(,
has unity, being, life and maximal
I
intelligence.
,~.
t"
t,Jv Xrt, which is caused by7D'H' / r;:. 6~ ~l.U'l . . , and
VoV.s, has unity, being, life, intelligence, and.discursive reason.
~~~, which are caused by~~v.J Tol."l)~ ~w1 and
Va iJs , have unity, being, life , and
minimal intelligence.
<pvT~, which are caused by7D'tJl and TdOY) ~ ~1.N1
have unity, being and minimal life.
rt-Kp~ O"'U;f"-a..TD.. ~ k 'P u )'ov ), which
are caused by ~~v and 10" ({y
, have
)/
uni ty and minimal being.
uA~, which ia caused by70'
has minimal
unity."

'

( 1 1 /

(

;y,

The One
The highest order of being in the scale of Proclus is
the One or the Pure Unity.
one.

This starting point is a logical

Proclus stands among the many of the universe and makes

a logical regress that there must be a One behind all multiplicity and that the multiplicity, which is apparent round
about, in some way partiCipates of unity.

The only

transcendence that he ascribes to the One is that it is in no;

wise infected with plurality.

9

.,'

~

After the" same manner he approaches the question of
cause and assumes that every cause must be superior to its
product. 10

In a logical regress he follows back and concludes
that there 'necessarily must be a firs.j;·....cause. ll
This first
cause he identifies with the Good and in turn states that all
unification is a Good therefore the Good is identical with the
12
one.
His scale of causation and identity of the One and the
Good are arranged by Dodds as follows:

"1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

The cause is superior to the effect. (7)
Unity and transcendence of the Good or
Final Cause (8): it is distinct from the
goodness both of dependent and of selfsufficient principles. (9-10)
Unity and transcendence of the Efficient
Cause. (11)
Identity of the Good with the EffiCient
Cause. (12)
. 13
Identity of the Good with the One. (13)"
The principle of the cause being superior to the

effect is one of the underlying structures of all Neo-Platonism.
If this principle is accepted, the modern doctrine of evolution,
patterned on the Darwinian theory, would irrevocably be ruled
out.

According to Neo-Platonism any emergence of the higher

from the lower must be attributed to the causative operation
which already exists.

Neo-Platonism would freely admit that

such emergence is f0und in the phenomenal order,14

but would

explain such emergence on the principle of the return of
power to its source.

The source of this power is eternal and

unchangeably active in the real order of things.

More shall be said on this matter later.

It is well, however,

to mention here that probably Plotinus was the first to apply
Systematically the principle that the cause has always a higher
and fuller reality than the effect.

This

doctrll~e

is not ex-

clusively a Neo-Platonic doctrine but is also implicit in
Plato's doctrine of Being and

Becomi~4

It nas thus far been

seen that the One is also the Primal Good and the Efficient
Cause of all else.

This, however, does not satisfy Proclus and

he pushes his logical quest next into t~e realm of reality and
endeavors to

it in grades.

arran~e

His method here is the same

as used centuries later by st. Thomas.* It is the doctrine of
15
the Unmoved Muver.
He uses the terms intrinsically or extrinsically moved.

He draws the perfectly logical conclusion

that the self-moved must have the primacy over all movers.

It

is the Unmoved Mover.
The next step in his consideration of reality is the
power of reflecting upon one's self ana he concludes tnat

ever~

original self-moving thing is capable of reversion upon itself.

He also concludes that bodies cannot revert upon them-

selves and hence all things capable of reverting upon
must be incorporeal.

themselve~

He says,

"For it is not in the nature of any body to revert
upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is
conjoined with that upon which it reverts: Hence
it is evident that every part or a body reverted
upon itself must be conjoined with every other
part - since self-reversion is precisely the case
in which the reverted subject and that upon which
* Note:

That is the method of st. Thomas in reference to the
one item viz: "The Unmoved Mover."

I

"it has reverted become identical. But this is impossible for a body, and universally for any di- ~
visible substance: for the whole of a divisible
substance cannot be conjoined with the whole of
itself, because of the separation of its parts,
which occupy different positions in space. It
is not in the nature, then, of any body to revert
upon itself so that the whole is reverted upon
the whole. Thus if there is anything which is
capable of reverting upon itsI~~ it is incorporeal and without parts."
The gradation of reality, according to Proclus, as
worked out by Dodds, is as follows;

•

n(a)

Vertical stratification of reality:
1. There is an Unmoved and a Self-moved. (14)
2. The Self-moved has reflexive consciousness (17), and is therefore incorporeal
(15) and independent of Body (16)
3. There is nothing in the effect that is
not primitively in the cause (18).
Therefore Soul, being the source of selfmovement in bodies, is primitively selfmoved (20).
.
.
4. The primitive character of any grade is
permanent and universal (l~). Hence intelli~ence does not belong primitively to
Soul·t20)
.
5. There are thus four grades, Body, soul,
Intelligence, and the One. (20)

(b)

General structure of reality in each stratum:
1. As a One and Many. (21-2)
2. As a triad of Unpar!~cipated, Participated,
Participant. (23-4)
According to the above the One is the highest of all

reality and has the power of reversion upon itself.

The

doctrine has moved from a metaphysical abstraction and is
identified with the Summum Bonum and is the ground of individuality in that all things work according to natural appetite
toward the largest good.

Each individual must reach an indi-

vidual good and fit into the pattern of the all-embracing Good.

He further, in proposition 18, attributes to this One the power
of reflexive conscience.

He also states that this f'unetion is

in nowise 'the function of a body.

It is in keeping with his

doctrine of Unity because in the operation of reflexive conscience it is not a case of one part of the soul bein6 subject

.....

and the other part object but it is the sum unit functioning as
both subject and object and therefore his unity of the One is
preserved.
the real.

This, it will be found, is.true of each stratum of
Each grade of reality, except the One alone, is an

independent principle and enjoys unification though by participation.
On the matter of procession and reversion Proclus is

at once confronted with the problem of preserving the unity
of the One and at the same time accounting for the existence
of a universe outside the One.

This, according to Dodds, calls

forth four points under each division; that is, under procession and under reversion.

His scheme of stating the problem

of Proclus is:
fI(a) Procession
1.
2.
3.
4.

Law
Law
Law
Law

of'
of
of
of

Emanation (25).
Undiminished Giving (26,27).
Continuity (28, 29).
Immanence (30).

(b) Reversion
1. Reversion retraces the movement of

Procession (31-4,38).
2. Triad of Immanence, Procession,
Reversion (35).
.
3. Reversion is recovery of value lost in
Procession (36, 37).
4. Three grades of reversion (39).18

He maintains that the laws of emanation do not diminish the resources of.the cause.

.'

At the present we are

interested only in the relation oT the One to this process of
procession and reversion.

In a later chapter i t will be ex-

amined more in detail since it is the heart and soul of the
participation philosophy.

The One

i~\he

Efficient Cause from

whence the next highest order of reality proceeds.

The

movement does not start or occur within-the One since any

•

movement would destroy its unity, and if it be external to the
One, i t must be derive.d from the One ei·ther by another external
movement (this would lead to an infinite regress) or wi tilout
movement, which is the doctrine of Proclus.
His next item in the Elements of Theology is the discussion of the self-constituted.

The self-constituted is

identified with the One and the Good, not as something equal to
them but as the same thing.

The self-constituted cannot depend
.....
upon anything prior to it or any other cause which is superior
-

to it for its existence or its activity.

The self-constituted

is capable of reversion upon itself and is without temporal
origin.

It is also imperishable and wit!lout parts, or simple.

It is perpetual and transcends the things that are measured by
time with respect to their existence.

It is of an eternal , sub-

stance.
At least Proclus in his discussion of the henads or
gods, gives the name of God to the One or the Good. 19
He
uses the word gods in the plural and places the gods in the
highest of orders or series but makes of the One or the Good a

sort of Godhead.

When the question of participation is dis-

.'

cussed in further detail, other reference to this matter will bE
made.

This plurality of henads seems to be brought in by

Proclus not only to maintain the One as such, but also to account for the ones which are found in reality.

FUrther, he

says that all which proceeds from

must remain in

any.~inciple

the producing cause and proceeds from it.
work for his doctrine of reversion.

T~is

lays the ground

By connecting ooth cause

•

and effect with this common link, he does not allow them to
become entirely separated and thus they never are absolutely
distinct things; else the effect might become an altogether new
thing.

In his own words he says,

"Every productive principle will imitate the One,
the productive cause of the sum of tnings: for
the non-primal is everywhere derived from the
primal, so that a principle productive of certain
things must derive from the principle which produces all things. Therefore, every productive
principle produces it~oconsequents while itself
remaining steadfast. n
Proclus' doctrine of reversion is summed up in this
statement:
effect that remains in ~!s cause proceeds
from it and reverts upon it."

n~yery

He accounts for the union of things with things and reality
with reality by this philosophy of procession and reversion.
He deduces his doctrine of reversion from the fact that each
thing has a natural· appetition of its well being and of the
Good and has an upward -tension toward its begetter.

In his

attempt to account for the One and the Many in the highest
realm of reality, Professor Taylor holds that Proclus was

teaching a doctrine of the attributes of God something like the

.'

doctrine of Philo and the later scholastics, but this, as Dodds
points out, is very, very doubtful. 22
Intelligence
Here again the system of triads, which pervades his

......

whole system, is brought forth; namely, the unparticipated and
the participated and the partaker.

He holds that there is a

hierarchy of intelligences and in his

~

statement says:

"There is both unparticipated and participated intelligence; and the latter is participated either
by supra-mundane or by intra-mundane souls.
"For the whole number of intelligences the unparticipated is sovereign, having primal existence
(Propositions 23, 24). And of the participated
intelligences some irradiate the supra-mundane
and unparticipated soul, others the intra-mundane.
For the intra-mundane class cannot proceed without
mediation from the unparticipated Intelligence,
since all procession is through like terms
(Proposition 29), and a class which is independent
of the world-order bears more likeness to the unparticipated than one which is locally distributed.
Nor, again, is the supra-mundane class the only
one: but there must be intra-mundane intelligences,
first, because there are intra-mundane gods
(Proposition 165); secondly, because the worldorder itself is possessed of intelligence as well
as of soul; t.i:lird, because intra-mundane souls must
participate supra-mundane intelligences through
the mediation of intelli~ences which are intramundane (Proposition 109),,23
After a long and intricate dialectic process, Proclus
concludes that the entire intellectual series is finite.
proves this on the basis of logical unity.

Intelligences are

finite in two aspects:
(a)

He

In that their number is limited and therefore not infinite.

(b)
The

Intelligences are below the One and therefore not infinite in the order of being.

..'In

Primal Intelligence is divine and unparticipated.

his

discussion of the order of Intelligence he says that every intelligence is a whole though not in the sense of one composite
of parts while every unparticipated

~~lligence

is a whole

without qualification and has its parts implicit in its

totali~

On the oth:.::r hand, each specific intelligence contains the wholE
as a whole in the parts.

•

In this one aspect it is all things

specifically and there remains a constant that runs through all
intelligences.

This constant is t.tle cause, wh:L.ch in this case

is the higher order of intelligence, and the cause remains in
the effects and thus runs as a stream, as it were, or forms a
constant which links the successive orders together.

The

higher and more universal the cause the farther does the constant reach in power but not in extension of production numerically.

He ends by saying that every participated divine

intelligence is participated by divine souls and that participation assimilates the participant to the participatedprincipIe and causes it to have the same nature and thus the soul is
annexed to a divine intelligence.

To quote his own words,

which are very clear, he says,
"Every participated divine intelligence is participated by divine souls.
"For if participation assimilates the participant
t'o the participated prinCiple and causes it to
have the same nature, it is plain that a soul
which participates and is annexed to a divine intelligence is itself divine, participating through

r-~-------------------.
"the mediation of the intelligence the divinity
immanent therein. For that divinity is cooperative in linking the participant soul to
the intelligence and thus bindin~4the divine
to the divine. (Proposition 56).

.'

Intelligence 'stands midway between the One and the
next lower order of being.

To the One. by participation and to

9'"

the lower order because it is the consequent to which intelligence is the cause.

Proclus makes it, then, to be identical,

after a manner, with both its priors

a~

its consequents.

The

superior Intelligence, or the Unparticipated Intelligence,
knows all things unconditionally; while subsequent intelligence
knows all in one special aspect.

They are capable of self-

reversion and know themselves, while the unparticipated knows
itself only, but since it contains the whole within itself it
knows all things.

He makes the Primal Intelligence, as well

as all other intelligences, to be eternal.

They seem secondary

to the One only in order of being and not in priority of time • .....
Probably his system of procession and reversion compels him
to make them eternal since he makes all proceed from the One
and return tu it.

If the On'e is eternal and all lower orders

proceed from it, and if, as Proclus maintains, tne cause remain::
in the, effect and reaches as deep as the effect may go, then
all proceeds from the One and must be eternal.
deduction.

It is a logical

Proclus is famous for his logical method and is so

insistent upon it that the eternity of intelligence is logically necessary to his system.

..

soul and Matter

'

"Soul", as Proclus says, "is the living world."

It

is not thought as opposed to thing; it is its own world, as
Spirit is its own world.

It is just witnin the confines of

real existence (ousia); but it is

mo~'~oosely

integrated tnan

the world of Spirit, and therefore the particular forms which

.

compose it are not, when taken apart, what they seem to be.
The world of the soul

(the kosmos zotikos) is real but it can

not be pulled to pieces without admixture of error.

25

That is,

singulars cannot be taken out of the pattern of the whole
because in so considering single things they would lack some
of their relationships with the whole and therefore this lack
of knowledge of such relationships would constitute error.
Proclus distinctly says that Matter is not evil but
, "a creation of God"
of the world.

(yl Y'v~ p..~ at-ou) necessary to the existence

This thought is not well developed in Plotinus

and he did shrink from endowing his own "Matter" with active
powers of resistance.

Moreover, he never regarded reality

(ousia) as the result of conflicting elements in the Absolute,
nor would he have admitted that without tension there can be
no life "Yonder".

But he does say in one place "the All is,

made up of contraries".26

Proclus would deny that there are

any active powers or powers at all given to Matter.

Evil,

therefore, could not be a resistance on the part of Matter
because Matter is perfectly passive.
gree very decidedly with Plotinus.

In this he would disa-

,....

r

Lower kinds of Matter are created immediately by the
Absolute.

Proclus says that the One acts directly upon Matter.

.'

His doctrine is that the higher the principle, the further down
does its power extend.

27

Proclus makes necessity and will with God identical.
"Proclus is more emphatic in rej~~ng dualistic interpretation of the nature of Matter.
Matter, he says, cannot struggle against the
Good, since it cannot act in any way. It is
not disordered movement; for movement implies
force, and Matter .has none. It is. not the evil
one, since it is an essential part of the composition of the world, and is derived from the
One. It is not 'necessity' though it is necessary. What then is it? Take away order from
everything that is orderly, and what remains
is Matter. It is that which, if it had any
active power, which it has not, would produce
disintegration in that which is integrated,
disconnection in that which is connected. It
is in a word that which is no thing, though
no absolutely nothing; it is a 'true lie l .,,28
Necessity in the system of Proclus Simply means that
if Matter had not been created the impartation of the Good to
creatures could not have been accomplished.

Matter was neces-

sary else all would have remained hidden in the ineffable One.
It is necessary to generation.
According to the above Proclus attributes the origin
of Matter directly to the One.

When he says the world of

.

Matter is derived from the One, it would seem that he bases it
~n

the logic which reigns between cause and effect.

cause transcends its resultant.

Every

It would seem that the actual

is the perfect for him, and the potential is imperfect and that
any particular thing passes into actuality through the agency
of that in which its potentiality is already actual.

Tracing

~

thiS back one

must,~of

found only in the One.

course, find pure actuality.

This is

.'

Then logically the One produces all

things through the principle of becoming actual.

In proposi-

tion 27 he says,
"Every producing cause is productive of secondary
existences because of its completeness and superflu! ty of potency.
;;, ..,
"For if it had produced not because of its completeness, but by reason of a defect of potency,
it could not have maintained unmoved its own
station: since that which throug~ defect or
weakness bestows existence unon another furnishes
the substance of that other by a conversion and
alteration of its own nature. But every producer remains as it is, and its consequent proceeds from it without change in its steadfastness. (Proposition 26). Full and complete, then,
it brings to existence the secondary principles
without movement and without loss, itself being
what it is, neither transmuted into the secondaries nor suffering any diminution. For the
product is not a parcelling-out of the producer:
that is not a character even of physical generation or generative causes. Nor is it a transformation: the producer is not the matter of
what proceeds from it, for it remains as it is,
and its product is a fresh existence beside it.
Thus the engenderer is established beyond alteration or diminution, multiplying itself in virtue
of its generative potency and furnishing from
itself secondary substances~29
In support of the statement that his system is based
more on logic than in the investigation of nature with regard
to the origin of Matter, attention is drawn to Proposition 26,
which reads as follows:
"Every productive cause produces the. next and
all subseque~t principles while itself remaining
steadfast." 0
He would, of course, hold that there may be many intermediate
steps between the One and the world of Matter.

One is at a

r ~loSS

to understand how Matter can ever revert back to the One

in any other manner but logically.

.'

Proclus holds that every

effect remains in its cause and proceeds from it and reverts
upon it.

Matter is certainly an effect with the One as its

ultimate cause.

Although there are secondary causes

procession, Matter must revert back a,t'..J.east to soul.

in the
Proclus,

however, does not explain how this actuallY takes place and
deals with it on a basis of pure logic only.

He says that body

has no participation in soul and it WOu\d seem that a definite
break in the order of reversion would of necessity take place.
His own words are:
"From this it is apparent why Matter, taking its
origin from the One, is in itself devoid of
Form; and why body, even though it participates
Being, is in itself without participation in
soul. For Matter, which is the basis of all
things, proceeded from the cause of all things;
and body, which is the basis of ensouled existence, is derived from a principle more universal than soul, in31hat after its fashion it
participates Being."
In man's reversion back to the One he does not explain how he makes the transition from one level of reality
or being to the other but seems to teach that in special cases
man, while yet in the body, can have ecstatic experiences with
the One.

In the scheme of Plotinus, which is not so clear in

Proclus, Matter is used in many ways.

Ell but nonexistent'

Matter, which is at the bottom of the scale, is redeemed in
giving itself as the recipient of form.

In so doing it is an

image of the great surrender whereby the World-soul receives
illumination from Spirit and the ineffable self-surrender by

which Spirit itselr awaits the visitation or the absolute
Godhead.

Matter, according to Proclus, is the

the

resultan~'or

direct act or the One but yet it is never to be redeemed becausE
it has no self-surrender power.

It was necessary to create

Matter in order that the will-activities or the Soul might
become actualities.

Matter,

however,·~

not in opposition to

the Good because it has no power or its own.
Proclus rurther says that God created the world by

•

His will, His goodness and His providence, a trinity in unity
of motives.

These correspond to the three attributes which he

ascribes to Spirit-Being, Power, Activity.

The soul descends

into the phenomenal world because it desires to imitate the
providence or the gods.

32

He would hold that the higher does

not need the lower; that is, God does not need the universe,
but God would have remained hidden without the universe.

There-

rore, the universe is necessary in order that the Good might
be revealed and in the process of procession and reversion the
lower can imitate the higher and finally arrive at its proper
source or end in reverting back to the higher.

The soul, when

it is separated rrom the body, has the Pneuma (shadow) as its
vehicle.

The vehicle, or Pneuma, has been received by the soul

rrom the Celestial sphere.

It is a sort of astral or gaseous

body which the soul wears when it leaves its earthly body.

He

almost makes it to be a corporeal thing although its substance
is or extreme tenuity.

It is an invisible, intangible body,

the first incorporation or the soul.
principle nothing could exist.

Apart from this unirying

All would be formless and indeterminate and therefore
would have no being properly considered.

The principle

unity

~f

in the soul is of higher order than that in natural things.

A

body has less unity because its parts are locally separate.
Even the unity in the soul is not the highest unity because
there are many individual souls.

Par~~ular

souls, because of

what they have in common, are derived from a general soul. This
general soul is their cause but it is not identical with all
of them.

In turn, this general soul fails short of complete

unity because it is the principle of life and motion in a world
which is other than itself.

The individual souls have intel-

lect and this points to a higher unifying principle.

This

unifying principle is stable intellect that is, ,itself

able to

think itself, and not the world, and this super-intellect contains, as identical with its own nature, the eternal ideas of
all forms, both general and particular.

Tnese forms oecome ex-

plicit in the things of space and time, but even this intellec~
so highly unifying has still a certain duality because although
the intelligence and the intelligible are the same in selfknowledge, that which this intelligence can do and does, distinguishes itself from the object of thought.

Above this is

Absolute Unity, the One which is simply identical with itself •
•

This is other than All-being but is the cause of All-being.
is the highest good to which all things aspire.

It

The greatest

good for particular things is the greatest unification.

Their

aspiration for goodness and unity beyond that which they possess
cannot be explained without positing the Absolute One and the

Absolute Good as their source and end.
fies the One and the Good.,

Proclus later identi-

.'

In regard to this particular pOint,

Proclus goes beyond Aristotle, who held that the One could
think itself.

To

Proclus, the attribute of thinking itself

belonged to mind only and not to the One.
Proclus, with Plotinus,

alIQ~

a genuine reality to

all grades of being and this extends even to Matter.

He does

not hold that virtue and knowledge here are simply images of

•

archetypes yonder in the intelligible world but that everything
which is here is there.

Plotinus is very clear in his state-

ment of this and Proclus follows very definitely the same
doctrine; namely, that first, second and third orders in the
intelligible principles are not spatial. 33

In the intelligible

order body may be said to be in the soul and soul in the One. 34
By such expressions a relation of dependence rather than a
being in a place in the sense of locality is to be understood.
Every multitude must participate in some manner in
the One.

If a multitude had no unity at all, it would consist

either just of parts which are not beings

or parts which are

themselves multitudes, and so on to infinity.

Every multitude,

according to Proclus, is at the same time one and not one but
derives its existence from the One in itself.

Logically, that
,

which is produced cannot be greater than the producer.

Later,

it will be seen that the One as cause penetrates all things
even to the lowest order by remaining in the effect.

He main-

tains that the higher in the causal order, the lower down is
the reach of that cause.

Thus the One being at the highest has

the farthest reach and remains even to the lowest forms. After
identifying the Good with the One he goes on to show thdt the
First Good is that for which all beipgs strive.
fore, be before all beings.

Nothing can be added to it else it

would be lessened by such addition
and First Good.

It must, there-

...

SO ~t

stands as the simple

If there is to be adequate and trustworthy

knowledge, there must be an order of causation and this necessitates a first in this order.
because that would make the same
ior, better and worse.

Causes .ould not go in a circle
thi~gs

to be prior and poster-

There can be no infinite series because

to make logical knowledge pOSSible, or at least to have logical
order, which to Proclus is absolutely essential to real knowledge, there mus~ be a final term. 35

CHAPTER IV
THE DOCTRINE CIt' PARTICIPi.TION

A General Sketch.
Wbile words cannot be

naile~'~ight

to any meaning ex-

clusive of all others, yet most philosophic writers have been
very careful to give words a certain connotation and then use
them according to that meaning.

As the \urden of this thesis is

to rest upon the doctrine of participation, it might not be a
complete loss to attempt to define the word participation and at
least establish and clarify its meaning according to its use in
/

the writings of Proclus.

The word in the Greek is ~~Tc X.W

This is the first person present indicative of the verb.
noun simply means a participating one.

).

The

Taking the verb apart it

)1

is a combination of r.rvE/~) and (c,(t,..J).

(jA-('-lZ)used in compo-

sition has the following meanings according to Liddell and Scott,
1. of community or participation;
common with others.

2. of community of a.ction in

With the genitive it means to be in the

midst of objects or in the midst of, among, or between. Sophocles'
used it in Ph. 1312.

<r-i:~ ~~vTW)I {"IVa.,) to be with or among

the living ones or to belong to that tribe or group.

To

sh~re

a common life with them.

Also used in Aeschylus Ag. 1037.

C71bX(;.Jy r-l-Ta:. JaV'", Wy

)

means among ehe slaves of the cities

which signifies a sharer of the life of the slaves.
Another meaning of the geni ti ve is in cornmon with, in
connection with, along with, by aid of.

These uses imply closer

~

union than the Greek word
)

(fA-6T4." r301

(ffU

v).

In the Iliad 13:700

t'

w~v €rc-~DvTo) means by the aid of, in a ~.ombat,

or fighting among the ranks.
~fr-~) with the accusative it means:

A. of motion,

right into the middle of, coming into or among, especially where
a number of persons are implied (as iBt& a tribe)
II. 15,54.
or go in search uf.
after, behind.

B. In pursuit of or quest of, to pursue one
C. Mere sequence or succession.

•

D. In order of time next after.

E.

Next
In order

of worth or rank, or according to.
The word

I'

(J.-~\(l.)

has many other meanings but since

they do not have any particular bearing on our subject the above
will be sufficient.
})

The other word in this combination is

(~~~)

which

means:
"Active Voice - Radic. signf., to have, hold.
I. to have in the hands, in Hom. very freq.
to receive in the hands:- hence in various usages.
1. to have, hold, possess: of outwara. goods,
propert~,)~tc., the most common usage, Hom.:
later (~ f: ¥orT€-5. ), a, wealthy or fo],:erful man,
Soph. AJ • .1~7, Valck, Pnoen. 408; 0 €Xov~S
,
the weal thy, Eur. Aic. 57.
36
Passive voice - to be possessed by, belong to."
Now putting both of these words together, the compound
as rendered according to the Lexicon of Liddell & Scott
as follows: First the verb form,
-"
"t--t-ltXw) to share in, partake of, enjoy a
share, take part in. Construct, usu. c. gen.
rei only. To be a member of a tribe, to share
same blood. In Plato, to partake in constituent ideas.,,37

wou~d

be

Second, the noun form,
/

nCt--,"TD)<..OS) sharing in, partaking of, c. gen.
Eur. Ion 697, Plat. Phaedr. 262 D. etc.; a partner, accomplice in. (70~ ¢>o"'YOY ) with dative of
persons, to share or enjoy a friendship; partakers
in common, in acc. case. noB

.'

One further source of information conc8rning the
meaning of this term is the New Testam~t.

The noun form of

the very word is used in the plural in Hebrews 6:4, where it is
rendered 'partakers' or

~articipaters'

of the Holy Ghost.

•

In

the Latin Vulgate the word is rendered 'participes' and this
means, according to The Universal Latin Lexicon 39 , partakers of,
having a share in, to be a companion, a fellow, or an associate.
The verb form in Latin means to cause to share.

This statement

is important inasmuch as one of the main problems in both
Platonism and Neo-Platonism is whether this act of participation is a cause or an effect.

If the participation originates

in the thing itself, then it would of necessity have to be coeternal with the thing which it participates, if tnat thing be
-an eternal thing.

If it is an effect, then the power of giving

to the lesser reality a share of the greater must be vested in
the greater.

It will be seen that Proclus makes an endeavor to

settle this point.

In The Elements of

Theolog~

Proclus uses

over and over again this very Metexo in the transitive

sens~.

As a transitive verb it would mean that the lesser reality
does the action of participating in the higher reality, but it
would be too much to demand this meaning from his construction
because his entire system seems to make the participation on

the part of the lesser reality a sort of effect rather than a
cause.

It is at least logically an effect.

.'

One can be genu-

inely certain that the meaning of the word is to have in common,
to some degree, something which the higher reality is or possesses.

A more detailed investigation of his system

~ill

es-

tablish this point.
The major problem in all Platonism, and especially
in Proclus, is how the One can produce the many, or in other
words, how one thing can participate in·another.
great for triads.

Proclus is

The unparticipated, the participated and the

participating or participant, is the triad that he uses in this
doctrine.

One must be ever reminded that his system is a meta-

physical system based on logical order.

Space and time, in the

sense of chronolo6ical order, do not enter into his explanations
of the universe.

First in order is always that which cannot be

participated in, or the unparticipated.

This is tne One before

all, always distinguished from the One in all.

This in turn

generates the things that are participated in.

Next, and in-

ferior to these are the things that participate.

They are in-

ferior to those that are participated like the middle one is to
the first.

On the reach of the

One down through all beings and

as the cause remaining in the effect, vVhittaker says,
"The perfect in its kind, since in so far as it is
perfect it imitates the cause of all, proceeds to
the production of as many things as it can; as
the Good causes the existence of everything. The
more or the less perfect anything is, of the more
or the fewer things is it the cause, as being
nearer to or more remote from the cause of all.
That which is furthest from the principle is unproductive and the cause of nothing.

ttThe productive cause of other things remains in
itself while producing. That which produces is
productive of the things that are second to it,
by the perfection and superabundance of its
power. For if it gave being to other things
through defect and weakness, they would receive
their existence through its alteration; but it
remains as it is.

.'

"Every productive cause brings i.Qt~ existence things
like itself before things unlike. EQuals it
cannot produce, since it is necessarily better
than its effects. The progression from the
cause to its effects is accomplished by resemblance of the things that are ~econd in order
to those that are first. Being s1milar to that
which produces it, the immediate product is in
a manner at once the same with and other t.ilan
its cause.
It remains therefore and goes forth
at the same time, and neither element of the
process is apart from the other. Every product
turns back and tries to reach its cause; for
everything strives after the Good, which is the
source of its being; and the mode of attaining
the Good for e~ch thing is through its own
proximate cause. The return is accomplished by
the resemblance the things that return bear to
that which they return to; for the aim of the
return is union, and it is always resemblance
that unites. The progression and the return
form a circular activity. There are lesser and
greater circles according as the re~urn is to
things imrnediately above or to those that are
higher. In the great circle to and from the
principle of all, all things are involved. rt40
That which is nearer to the One is less in quantity
than the more distant but greater in potency.41

The more uni-

v,coral always precedes in this causal action and the more particular continues after it.

In the order of generalities 2n

the causal order being comes before living-being and livingbeing before man.

Life is below the rational power but where

there is no life there is still being.

Matter is the extreme

bound and it has subsistence only from the most universal cause,

I

namely, the One.

Tbe One is the subject of all things and there

fore'Matter proceeds from the cause of all.

.'

Even body, which is

below the sOQ4participates of existence but not from the soul
as it has its subsistence from the One which is more universal
than soul.

The more plurality or divisibility there remains in

any genus, the farther it is from the.Oae.
weakest.

Lik~wise

The finite is a sort of limited power.

it is the

In the dis-

cussion of the infinite Proclus holds that that which is infinite

•

is infinite neither to the things above it, nor to itself, but
to the things that are inferior.
ence to the inferior.

It always retainS a transcend-

It has something that exists from the un-

folding of its powers but is defined and held as a whole by itself and to that which is above it.

That which is above always

retains as cause an element imparticible or transcendent and retains by itself a certain detachraent from each succeeding stage.
Proclus introduces intermediate terms to bridge the gaps from
one order to a lower.

This is one distinct characteristic of

his system.
It should be said that this section of our discussion
is based principally on The Elements of TheoloKl because this
work is exclusively that of Pr9clus, and at the same time it is
his most complete statement and systematic explanation of
universe.

t~e

The references will be made to the propositions in-

stead of page numberings.
In every order of being Proclus maintains his triad of
the unparticipated, the participated and the participating one.
Vfuen

he speaks of

orde~

consideration is not to be given to

numerical or chronological order, but logical order.
order of dependence and interdependence rather thap of
second or last.

It is an
f~rst,

The One from which all things der·i ve their ex-

istence is first logically, and by virtue of being first in'
logical unity it has the farthest reach or is first in reach of
productivity and power.

The cause reMat.ns farthest in the effect

by being first in order of Qeing and therefore more universal and
effective.

All things having being owe that being to the One

ultimately.

of

•

Again the One is the Undiminished Giver by virtue

~

being first, and not only possessing unity, out by being unity

in see

In the material realm it might be debatable as to whether

a cause can remain an undiminished giver but it would seem that
Proclus can bear his case very well in the logical realm and in
the realm of spiritual or simple essences.

That is the realm in

which he starts, continues, and concludes his philosophy.

There

are, however, two illustrations in human work-a-day things that
bolster his position.

First, in the realm of knowledge, the

more one teaches or imparts to another does not decrease or
diminish the original supply of knowledge of t.ne teacher.
anything, teaching is a means of increase.

If

But, of course, for

Proclus the Primal Intellect is perfect in knowledge and not subject to increase.

Second, in the realm of holiness of lif,e, or

goodness, the more good things or acts one might do does

not

diminish the intrinsic goodness of that inaividual, and so the
logical position of Proclus is, at least to this degree, demonstrable in the realm of direct observation.
The very debatable question about conservation of

of energy; that is, whether the sum total of energy in the

.'

universe suffers any increase or decrease, would at least not
militate

against the position of our philosopher.

The great difficulty as one attacks the ']jroblem of
participation, is that there are few terms in the human language
which are adequate to describe tne aa.t'J,vities of simple essences
and spiritual functions.

There are found, however, many mental

and moral activities, such as mentioned above, which give suf-

•

ficient lead to require only deductions that are well within the
bounds of reason to complete the transitions to the general participation scheme which undergirds the whole system of Proclus.
1Nhen he says that every multitude participates unity, it is the
question of the whole being in the part as well as the part
being in the whole.

In dealing with simple SUbstances or terms

such as unity, being, and cause, one carulot divide them.

The

whole scheme of these things lies outside the realm of extension
or quantity, just as goodness and knowledge do.

In 11is dis-

cussion of cause the whole possibility of knowledge rests in the
42
fact of a final term.
He maintains that it would make no
difference how many intermediate causes there might be as this
would in nowise weaken the Efficient and First Cause but rather
holds that the First Cause is superior to all its product.
There must be a First Cause else all the causal chain would run
in a circuit and tllen cause and effect would both be prior and
Proclus not only holds that the cause
consequent at once. 43
must be equal to the effect but very baldly states that it of
necessity must be superior.

Of course he means in efficiency

there can be only one First Cause and this First Cause is the
One.

.'

Since unity must be the subsistence of all manifold, the

manifold is necessarily posterior to the One,44
identified with the One as the principium.

the Good being

The First Cause of

all transmits its causal relation into all the effects wnich
follow and therefore imparts to them :tQ.is element of good, which
in turn, is the appetite within all the effects that causes them
to strive to return again to the Good.
link or undergirding binds

t11e

A kind. of indissoluble

•

universe together.

It serves as

a sort of desire and this desire is the reversive power which
45
turns the attention of all things back to the Good.
In Proclus' scheme of participation he seems to have
an abhorance for any wide gaps and in order to fill in these
gaps between the several great and sharp divisions of reality,
he propounds the doctrine of the Demiurge,.to fill the gap between

the One and the Intelligence.

In the system of Proclus

the Demiurge simply means that the One has delegated to the
henads the power of origination.

That is, these henads have a

certain power of producing or of generation, and thus there are
many pOints of origination.

The One is not the direct world-

maker but it gives to these sub-divinities a sort of creative
power and thus fills the gap.
henads or gods.
ter of unity.

After the One he has a

sect~on

on

The whole number of these gods have the characThey are likewise self-complete but all remain in

ferior to the One. They are all above life, being and intelligence.46 This doctrine of henads if probably a consequent development from Plotinus.

Proclus seeks the cause of plurality in things that
are of a higher stage than the intelligible world;
was content to stop there.

Plot~us

Whittaker helps us at this point.

He says,
"Much has been written upon the question, wha.t the
henads of Proclus really mean---Now so far as the
origin of the doctrine is conceT~d, it seems to
be a perfectly consequent development from
Plotinus. Proclus seeks the cause of plurality
in things at a higher stage tnan the intelligible
world, in which Plotinus had been content to find
its beginning. Before being and .ind are produced, the One acts as it were through many
pOints of origin; from each of these start many
minds; each of which again is the principle of
further differences. As the primal unity is ca~~ed
(Theos), the derivative unities are in corl'es;)ondence called (gods). Thus the doctrine is pure
deductive metaphysics_ n47
Even at tne

r~sk

of another long quotation it would

seem necessary to quote the very important Proposition 116, in
which Proclus offers proof for his doctrine of participation.
The same question is involved in each step from one order of
being to a lower one.

If one step can be set forth, it will

serve for an explanation of all the others.
"That with the other henads we reach the participable, we shall prove as follows: If after the
First Principle tnere be another imparticipable
henad, how will it differ from the One? Ii' it
be one in the same degree as the lat~er, why
should we call it secondary and the One primal?
And if in a different degree, then relatively
to simple Unity it will be one and not-one. If
that element of 'not-one' be nQthing substantive,
the henad will be pure unity (and identical with
the One); but if it be a substantive character
other than unity, then the unity in the henad
will be participated by the non-unity. What is
self-complete will then be this unity whereby
it is linked to the One itself, so that once
more the god, qua god, will be this component
(prop_ 114), while that which came into

"existence as not-one exists as one by participation in the unity. Therefore every henad
posterior to the One is participable; and every
god is thus participable. n48
The order of tne divine henads is graduated.

~.

Some are

more universal while others are more par'ticular; the more particular being generated fromtne more,up.iversal
but not by
... ..,.
division, nor by alteration, nor even through the manifold relationships, but by the production of secondary progressions
through superabundance of power. 49 The.gods transcend all division, all alteration and all relation and are only d.ifferentiated one from another in an o~der of power. 50
These henads, or at least the primal henad, communicate their power to mind, and through mind it is presented to
soul and then the soul actuates the body and even the body, in
a sense, participates in the henad and to that extent participates divinity.
the soul.
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In fact, the body receives life and motion from

Those beings nearest to the divine henads

partici-~

pate directly and those more remote through various mediums.
The more universal a thing is, the more direct its participation
in the order of being above.

This is but another way of ex-

pounding the doctrine of the Primal Cause reaching farthest into
the effects.

There are no limits of space and time set to the

penetration of the powers of divinity.
It is thrO,ugh the providence of these gods that all
things finally work for good since evil is but an absence of
good and that which may seem an evil taken in relation to a part
or parts becomes a good in the pattern of the whole.

The divine

henads are present to all things that participate but all things
are not present to them in the sense of capacity to participate,
~

that is, all things are not present to them in the same manner.
Divinity is present to each series of being, in a manner to each
causal order, and proportionately to each particular stage.
of these divine henads are

fini~e

in

~~ber

All

but one is infinite

to the other in power.

It is infinity of potency and each minor
52
order is comprehensible to what is below it.
Another important item in the·doctrine of participation
is expressed in Proposition 77 on causality.
flAIl that exists potentially is advru!ced to actuality
by the agency of something which is actually what
the other is potentially: the partially potential
by that which is actual in the same partial resgect
and the wholly potential by the wholly actual." 0
It is impossible for the potential to advance itself to actuality
because all potentiality is imperfect and actualization is a kind
of perfection.
the effect.

The cause would, therefore, be less perfect than

Thus the power of actualizing emanates from the

cause which is actuality and actuality continues tnrough the
series advancing the residue of potentiality in a given item of
the series to actuality in the same series or in the series below
and so the perfection of actuality to any degree is derived from
a former actuality above.
Proclus uses the word potency in two different ways.
One he calls perfect potency and this refers to active power or
the creative power of the One and is in contrast to the passive
potency, Matter.

Proclus does not restrict tnis active potency
to God alone but to all intellectuals. 54

I

All that comes to be arises out of tne twofold potency.
The agent must have the creative power or potency and
must have the passive potency.
all

do~~

th~,

9roduct

Every agent has an active potency

the line of being tintil we reach'body.

is without quality and without potency.

Body in itself

It cannot act by virtue

of being body but only by virtue of a ;»Petency of action residing
in it; that is, it acts by participation of potency.

Incorporeal

things participate passive affections along with the bodies to

•

which they are joined and feel the effect of the divisible nature
of the bodies, although in their own being the incorporeals are
without parts.

This is almost the same as the doctrine of

i~11a-

nence in which the whole is found in every part and the part in
the whole, since in simple essences there is no separateness or
divisibility.
The above seems to be only a restatement of tne
doctrine of the cause remaining in the effect.

The link between

,...

the participated and the thing participating is expressed in the
following words by Proclus.
flAIl that is participated without loss of separateness is present to the participant tnrough
an inseparable potency which it implants.
"For if it is itself something separate from the
participant and not contained in it, something
which subsists in itself, then they need a mean
term to connect them, one which more nearly resembles the participated principle than the participant does, and yet act~ally resides in the
latter. For if the former is separate, how can
it be participated by that which contains neither
it nor any emanation from it? Accordingly a potency
or irradiation, proceeding from the participated
to the participant, must link the two; and this
medium of participation will be distinct from both. n55

This link being, as

Proc~us

maintains, something dis-

..

tinct from both seems to be an attenuation of the participated
,
substance which is not, in itself, completely actualized althoug
in the participated it is.

It is a logical connection with a

sort of substantial uridergirding.

Proclus does not say exactly

what is is, but calls it a kind of mean-term.
.language difficulty enters.

Here, again, the

The very use of the word attenuation

in this thesis has a smack of material content to it and yet in

•

this discussion of logical order quantitative terms are more of
a hindrance than help even though they are thought of in a sort
of figurative sense.
The above mentioned proposition was primarily directed
-to the elucidation of the problem of the relation of the soul to
the body, which was raised in

Proposition 80, and that is the

hardest problem of the whole doctrine of participation.
How Matter emerges from the spiritual even in a creativ

....

act on the part of the One is very difficult to settle. Proclus
interpolates a sort of tertium Quid 56 which serves as a connecting link.

He probably gets the idea of this tertium qUid

between body and soul from the fact that man proceeds in perception back to a fantasm and from the fantasm to the idea in the
soul.

.

The fantasm has a mental element and is a kind of attenua.

tion, to say the least, of the object itself, but containing a
mental element, as well as the material, it does form somewhat
of a link between the material objective universe and the simple
essences or spiritual entity called the soul.

In Proposition 24

the general scheme of the unparticipated, the participated and

the participating is concisely stated as follows:
"All that participates is inferior to the participated and this latter to the unparticipated.
.'
"For the participant was incomplete before the
participation, and by the participation has been
made complete: it is therefore necessarily subordinate to the participated, inasmuch as it
owes its completeness to the act of participation. As having formerly been iricomplete it is
inferior to the principle which completes it.
"Again, the participated, being the property of
one particular and not of all, has a lower mode
of substance assigned to it than ~at which
belongs to all and not to one: for the latter
is more nearly akin to the cause of all things,
the former less nearly.
"The unparticipated, then precedes the participated, and these the participants. For, to
express it shortly, the first is a unity prior
to the many; the participated is within the
many, and is one yet not-one; whi~~ all that
participates is not-one yet one." '1
Dean Inge in commenting on Plotinus offers an illus<-8

tration of how a soul participates in an idea.o

He raises the

question, "Can many souls participate the same idea without
division of the idea?
participate in it?"

Is the idea divided

amon~

the souls who

Of course,this is impossible.

But if not,

then one must think in terms not of extension and quantity, but
rise to the conception of the world of reality which is spiritual
and has its own laws.
He further comments that reality must be understood in

t erms

0f
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'
va.Lues.

The real attributes of reality are values,

and values in turn are nothing unless they are values of reality.
Truth, for example, is subjectively a complete understanding of
the laws and conditions of actual existence.

It is the true

interpretation of the world of sense, as notable by the soul
when illuminated by the spirit.

.'

In its objective aspect truth is

an ordered harmony of cosmic life interpreted in terms of final
law and nowhere contradicted by experience.

Perfect law and

order are not found in the world of ordinary experience.
are only found when the soul turns

These

spiritual world.

to.~e

The

imperfections are in our faulty apprehension.
The difficulty, says Dean Inge, is that the judgments
of values give us an essential graded wo:Id, while the judgments
of existences are not so easily graded.

Judgments of valuesdo

serve as an understanding for the system of Proclus.

His order

of existences or beings is based on their intrinsic value and by
diligently keeping to that realm less difficulty will be experienced.

The relation·of Mind and Matter is more easily under-

stood when based on their relative values.

Matter then becomes

a means of revelation or expression, and body only a means; or
in other words, a recipient of forms which belong to a higher
order and Matter to tne lower.
by its relative values.

Each, therefore, is understood

In this way the system of Proclus be-

comes highly intelligible.
Proclus commenting on the Alcibiades says,
"Goods that are indivisible are those which many may
possess at once, and no one is worse off' in respect
of them because another has them. Divisible goods
are tho~e in which one man's gain is another man's
loss." 6U
This is another way of stating the doctrine of the Undiminished
Qiver and that the gradation of being is according to value.
The thing that can be participated by many and yet remain

undiminished is of higher value than that which participates it.
In his attempt to elucidate the doctrine of

ca~~ality

he reiterates the doctrine that the more universal the cause the
wider its implications are in the effects, or the farther reach
it maintains in the effects.

In Proposition 56 he says,

"All that is produced by seconda:e.y.... beings is in a
still greater measure produced from those prior
and more determinative principles f6~m which the
secondary were themselves derived." .
In commenting on this proposition

Dodds~ays,

nVV'hen the principle of transcendence is pressed
too hard the world of experience tends to break
loose from its ultimate causes. This and the
following proposition are designed to obviate
this danger by showing that the ultimate causes
are actively present in the whole causal series.
Every cause is responsible not only for the existence of its effects but also for the whole of
the causative activity of those effects---a view
which seems logically to issue in a rigid deterministic monism, and is difficult to reconcile
with the doctrine of
(prop. 40).
For an iLLustration cr. in Tim. III. 222. 7 f f.
This theorem was found very useful by some of the
later scholastics as a means of reconciling the
emanationism taught by Avicenna with the orthodox
'creationist' view: it is cited for this .purpose
by Dietrich of Freiberg, de intellectu et
intelligibili, II. i, 134 Krebs. 'quidquid fiat
ab inferiori et secunda causa, illud idem fit a
prima causa, sed eminentiori modo, scilicet per
modum creationig~'; 1 cf. also Albert. Magn. X.
413 a Bocquet."
So long as the discussion is confined to indivisible
~ss~nces

and the causal chain, or in other words to metaphYSical

aspects of the universe, the gradation of values is rather easily
understood.

But again the big problem looms up - where, in this

system, is the inanimate matter going to be placed?
pri~ciple

On the

of the First Cause having the farthest reach, matter is

explained to be a direct creation of the One.
of participation in the Intelligible.

It is not capable

There would be more Matte

.,'

without form than there are souls or intelligibles below the One.
In Proposition 62,63 this doctrine is explained by stating that
every manifold that is nearer to the One has fewer members than
those more remote, but is greater in

~QWer.

It is quite ap-

parent that bodily natures are more numerous than souls, that

.,
than the divine henads.

souls are more numerous than intelligences and that intelligencffi
are more numerous

Since simple Matter

has no form it is at the one end as the product of the causal
One, and the simple One as First Cause stands at the other end
of the causal chain.

Whittaker says on this point:

"Proclus goes on to a characteristic doctrine of
his own, according to which the higher cause which is also the more general - continues its
activity beyond tnat of the causes that follow
it. Thus the causal efficacy of the One extends
as far as to Matter, in the production of which
the intermediate causes, fe2m intelligible being
downwards, have no share."
The inanimate in so far as it participates in form has
part in intellect and also in the creative action of intellect.
·This is seen in Proposition 57. 65

The Good is tne cause of all

that intellect is the cause of but not conversely.
of form are from the Good since all is thence.
being form, is not the ground of privation.

Privations

But intellect,
Matter in itself

has no form, and suffering privation of form it must be from
the Good.

Matter cannot act and therefore cannot in any way be

a principle of evil.

It is unable to struggle against the Good.

This is an important question because here Proclus departs from

Plotinus.

Inge says on this pOint, where he quotes from Proclus'

Commentary in the Alcibiades,
"Proclus-is more emphatic in rejecting the dualistic interpretation of the nature of Matter.
Matter, he says, cannot strug~le against the Good,
since it cannot act in anyway. It is not disordered movement; for movement implies force, and
Matter has none. It is not the evil principle,
since it is an essential part o~\he composition
of the world, and is derived from the One. It is
not 'necessity' though it is necessary. ~fuat then
is it? Take away order from everything that is
orderly, and what remains is Matter. It is that
which, if it had any active power,~which it has
not, would produce disintegration J.n that which
is integrated, disconnection in that which is
connected. It is in a word that which is no
thing, thougu.6not absolutely nothing; it is a
'true lie,."b
With God necessity and will always cOrreSl)ond.

Matter

was created in order that the will and activities of the soul
and spirit might become actualities.
to have been an eternal creation.
to tell.

With Plotinus Matter seems

With Proclus it is very hard

He maintains that it is not absolutely nothing and yet

oes not tell us exactly what it is.
In the discussion of Matter in Neo-Platonism the
roblem of evil necessarily arises.

Evils are the result, ac-

cording to Proclus, of conflict in the world of birth.

The

world is of such structure that it involves destruction, decay
and death.
hole.

But all this was necessary for the perfection

o~

the

Infinite possibility was also a necessary condition for

such perfection and therefore the existence of Matter.

Matter

of itself could not be evil because the philosophy of Proclus
ill not allow for two principles of exactly the same dignity
and im ortance.

Matter cannot be the cause of the fall of souls

because it does not explain the various inclinations of different souls.

There is no principle of evil.

dentical to the pursuit of good. 67

Evil is

..

alway~

i-

The cause of descent to re-

birth pre-exists in the soul itself as a certain experience of
alternation between the life of tne inteLLect and the life of
" t "lona I par.
t 68
it s own lrra

There is

~ao

latent in every soul

the desire to impart what good it possesses to lower orders and
hence the reason for birth and re-birth.

•

Matter can only be

considered an evil in the sense that it is the ultimate stage
of descent.

In this sense it is only a lesser good.

Such a

world as ours should of necessity exist for the perfection of
the whole, hence Proclus is an avowed Teleologist.

Even latent

dispositions to wrong need to be externalized in order that they
might be punished and thus corrected.
serve a good purpose.

This makes even Matter

Again by descending to a lower realm than

·the intellectual it runs the risk of loss and therefore to unite
with the material body is in that measure an evil.

Yet in view

of the whole it is a good and is providential because some souls
descend in order to raise others.

Proclus' doctrine of Fate and

Providence makes apparent evil in this world to be only the result of our faulty apprehensions.

In his De Providentia et Fato

he says,
"Many things escape Fate but nothing escapes Providence.,,69
¥mittaker commenting on this line says,
"Fate is the destiny undergone by particular beings
without insight into its true causes. With complete knowledge of reality, ~8te itself would be
seen as part of Providence."

All the parts according to this scheme are descended

..

to tbe good of the whole and a certain amount of freedom .is
allowed to individual souls and for this reason some souls go
lower than others.

But it would be inconsistent with the order

of the universe that any being, among men or demons, should be
always evil. 71
The ultimate redemption of all is guaranteed in his
philosophy of Progression and Reversion.
matter of freedom.

He says,

.

Ueberweg helps on this

"The psychical emanates from the intellectual.
Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its
activity related to ti~e. The soul of the world
is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substances, its parts being arranged in
harmonious proportions. There exist divine,
demoniacal and human souls. Occupying a midale
place between the sensuous and the divine, the
soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are
all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power
of the soul to turn back toward the divine.
Whatever it knows it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements of itself; it
knows the One through the supra-rational unity
present in itself. n72
Proclus grants a certain choice to each particular
soul, though he holds that each soul must by inherent destiny
descend at least once to birth in a body.

After this one birth

all others depend on the choice of the soul.
certain freedom but in the end all cnoice

This implies a

final~y

comes int9

subjection to Fate.
There is another complete innovation of Proclus' into
Neo-Platonic thought; namely, that of the astral body, or the
doctrine of the
RJ

pmA

Vehicle.

In his discussion of souls in The

l1.ts oJ: Theoloilv Proclus says that every soul takes its

proper origin from an intelligence which is the next higher

.'

order of being and from tnis inteliigence it has all the forms
which intelligence possesses primitively.

-

At least it has tnem

·potentially.73
In Proposition 195 he places soul in a sort of intermediate position between bodies and

i~i611igences,

the intelligible world and the sense world.
he says,

or between

In this proposition

•

"Every soul is all things, the thine;s of sense
after the manner of an exemplar and tne in"Gelligible things after the manner of an image.,,74 .
From this he moves on to the statement tllat eVEry participated
soul makes use of a body which is perpetual- and has a constitution witnout temporal origin and exempt from deCay.75

He will

not state plainly that the material body is perpetual, but
.claims that the very being of soul is to en-soul a body.
since this is the nature of, its

be~ng

And

it must en-soul a body at

all times and ,therefore there must be a

vehicl~

or

body which it en-souls in its birth and re-birth.

at~enuated

This astral

body is eternal in its essence but temporal in respect to the
measurement of its activities.

The vehicle of every particular

soul descends by the aad.ition?f vestures increasingly material
and in reversion it ascends, in company with the soul, throlfgh
the divestment of all that is material and recovers its

pro~er

form after the same analogy of the soul which makes use of it.
Although he claims that this vehicle

is immaterial and indis-

cerptible, yet he uses terms which are usually applied to extended bodies such as shape and size. greater and smal.1.er. etc ••

in discussing it in Proposition 210. 76

In this proposition he

.'

goes so far as to say that its appearancesat different times

are diverse.

He makes this concession in order to make the

astral body or vehicle conform to tne vcirious bodies which the

individual soul might en-soul through its births and re-births.
It would seem that Proclus resorts to

t~~in

order to sub-

stantiate or to carry out his scheme of triads throughout his
entire system.

As has been said before, his entire metaphysical

.

scheme is based on the nature of knowledge and in

t~e

analysis

of man there is found at the lower end a quasi material element
in perception with a very small amount of purely intellectual,
and at the other end a purely intellectual intuition of reality
Nith reason as the mean term.
separabl~

But as all these beings are in-

as a triad, so must he find in the union of soul with

Jody some mean term (the astral body which is tainted with the
naterial and yet attenuated to reach the immaterial and thus
~onnect

body and soul),' in·order to keep his triadic unities in

Gact.
As a final and more definite investigation of his
)articipation doctrine, let us look into those propositions
vhere the doctrine of participation is most prominent and most
!learly expounded.
In Proposition 30 he says t.ilat all tnat is immediately
)roduced by any principle must remain
md proceed from it.77

in the producing cause

In developing this statement .Proclus

lays that all procession, and procession is in a manner equal to
)roduction is accomplished through likeness. 78 Each order of

in discussing it in Proposition 210. 76

In this proposition he

.'

goes so far as to say that its appearancesat different times
are diverse.

He makes this concession in order to make the

astral body or vehicle conform to tne various bodies which the
individual soul might en-soul through its births and re-births.
It would seem that Proclus resorts

to~t~is

in order to sub-

stantiate or to carry out his scheme of triads throughout his
entire system.

As has been said before, his entire metaphysical

•

scheme is based on the nature of knowledge and in the analysis
of man there is found at the lower end a quasi material element
in perception with a very small amount of purely

intel~ectual,

and at the other end a purely intellectual intuition of reality
with reason as the mean term.
separabl~

But as all these beings are in-

as a triad, so must he find in the union of soul with

body some mean term (the astral body which is tainted with the
material and yet attenuated to reach the immaterial and thus
connect body and 'soul),' in·order to keep his triadic unities in~
tact.
As a final and more definite investigation of his
participation doctrine, let us look into those propositions
where the doctrine of participation is most prominent and most
clearly expounded.
In Proposition 30 he says tHat all tnat is immediately
produced by any principle must remain
and l)roceed from it.77

in the producing cause

In developing this statement .Proclus

says that all procession, and procession is in a manner equal to
roduction is accomplished through likeness. 78 Each order of

being produces its likeness first before unlikeness and in some
sense the product remains in the producer, be-cause if

th~,

term

proceeded completely from the producer there would be no identity with that which remained.

The common link of union with the

cause is that it remains in the cause and proceeds in the effect.
For if it remained altogether and only'..in the cause then there
would be no production.

It is both like and in some respect

different from the cause.

,.

These two relations are inseparable.

Dodds gives a good example.

"If a, b, c, are three terms in sequence, b both
proceeds from a and remains in it while c proceeds from a and b but remains only in b: thus
soul both remains in Intelligence and is produced from it, while Na~ure has wholly detached ~9
itself from Intelligence. (See In Tim. I. 12,19)"
Accordingly we have the triadic arcangement (a)
(b)}--

bY ~

K~\

-rrp ~ cS 05

(c)7Ipo' Ob'!»

•
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Another element wnich Proclus introduces is what he
calls continuity.

There is no void in the physical uniVerse so~
8l
there is none in the spiritual.
We must always kee.,tJ in mind
'that spiritual beings are not separated by spatial but by

qualitative intervals.

This spiritual continuity which Proclus

introduces in his philosophy of emanation and participation means
tha~

the qualitative interval between any term of the procession

and its immediate consequent is the minimum dif:(erence compatible
with distinctness; there are no gaps in the divine devol~tion,.8k
Whittaker says,
.
8D
"That Leibniz owes his idea of continuum to Platonism."
Again in Proposition 130 Proclus says,

"In any divine order the highest terms more completely transcend those immediately subordinate
to them than do these latter the subsequent terms;
and the second order of terms are more closely·'
linked with their immediate su-oeriors tnan are
their consequents with them. n84
This is because the higher are nearer to unity or the One and
enjoy more power or active potency.

Each successive cause in
10 ...

the various orders of reality would, according to ttlis scheme,
.be less able to remain distinct from its efiect.
:the order goes from better to worse,

bu~

In procession

in reversion it is from

worse to better and all that is lost in procession is restored
:in reversion plus the retention of inai viduali ty which it got
in procession.

Therefore, even to en-soul Matter would be a good

in so far as informing Matter would add to individual distinctness.

This continuity which Proclus introduces in his scheme of

emanation is carreid out scrupulously in each order of reality.
Beginning with the henads or gods, he has the same orderly

scheme~

In Proposition 132 he states "All orders of gods are
bound together by mean terms.,,85
cession through likeness.

,..

Even gods experience pro-

The gods possess the unbroken con-

tinuity, inasmuch as their substance is unitary.

The One is

their originative cause and they t~ke their definition from it. 86
In these divine orders the remission of power is introduced without loss of unity and the gods are more essentially unified'than
mere existence.

In their order the likeness of the derivat.ives

to the primary is greater than 1n the extentional orders.

All

I

classes of gods are, therefore, bound together by proportiol1Clte
terms and even the first principles do not pass from immaterial

into the emanations wholly diverse from themselves.

There are

intermediate terms which have characters in common both with

."

their causes and imm"diate effects.

They preserve an ordered

sequence in this generation of deities.

Each order of god is

participated by a more or less genus of existence according to
the nearness of the god to the One
hierarchy.

a.nQ '..;the

Good which heads the

Being is the first order below the gods and it par-

ticipates the gods.

Being is beyong

In~elligence

and life and

is the most universal cause and is ther:rore the highest participant.

It partakes more of unity than does Intelligence or life.

All these henads are intellectual and the unparticipatedIntelligence enjoys participation in them in the sense of likeness.

In-

telligence is true being and therefore, as has been said above,
being is the next direct or we might say the first product of
the henads. S7
Next in order after true being is Intelligence and

.as

again the unparticipated terms subsist prior to the participated.
Intelligence is a form

01"'

being which exists in itself and is

beyond participation. ' True being perfects Intelligence without
loss of transcendence to itself.
gift of being.

It gives to Intelligence the

Being an intelligible it imparts perfection to

Intel~igence.

On the question of souls the entire theory of Proclus
is not acceptable in any metaphysics today because of the physics
which were accepted in his time.
planets and other heavenly bodies.

He attributed souls to the
He claimed there were intra-

mundane intelligences because the world-order is possessed of

intelligences as well as of souls and that these intra-mundane

.'

souls and intelligences participated the super-mundane intelligences.

This question of gradation of intelligences is very
. intricate and obscure.

EVen Dodds claims

89

that a part of the

. text has been corrupted to the extent;,. ~lat it fails to make
sense, but for our purpose the following may be said.
. are at least three grades of intell.igences.

There

Tne unpar-Gicipated

and super-mundane which has itself for tts object of thought.
It is something akin to Aristotles' self-contemplative god.
intra-mundane is the world-soul and world
which produces intelligences.

intelligib~e

The

order

The third is the world of souls

which participates intelli6ences in the sense that they participate the forms in the world-order.
enjoy intuitive thought perpetually.

The higher intelligences
The human consciousness

does not enjoy intuitive thought except intermittently.

The

super-mundane souls seem to be a sort of make shift in the

sche~E

of Proclus to take the place of what Plotinus called the higher
part of the human soul.
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When souls pass in birth and re-birth from one bC(iy to
another Proclus claims that the vehicle or astral body participates the souls perpetually because these vehicles are also in91
destructible.
But the mortal bodies only participate souls intermittently.
for Proclus.

Intermittence of participation is the only real evil
The Neo-Platonists clashed with the Christian

doctrine of deliberate creation in time by maintaining an
,..

A

emanative creation which is timeless and unwilled.

For them the

only creative power is contemplation or intuitive thought, which

•

according to Dodds, at a certain level of being translates itself
automatically into spatio-temporal terms.

Each soul

approximate origin from an intelligence.

This intelligence

tak~s

its

gives to the soul which arises from i t.,'..as a part of the soul f s
being, rational notions of all that it contains.

The Intelli-

gence contains these forms primitively but in the soul they are

.

implanted by derivation, since the soul is the proCtuct of Intellil-gence.

This possession by derivation gives to the soul the ir-

radiations of the Intellectual forms.
dual knowledge.

The soul has sort of a

It is in a manner all things.

The things of

sense after the manner of an examplar and the intelligible things
after the manner of an image.
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The hierarchy or' s(;uls is more or less the same as that
of intelligences.

There are divine souls that are sovereign over

many souls and herein lies the providential direction wnere all~
the parts converge to the well being of the whole.
There is another very important reference to participation in Propositions 66 to 74 93 and especially in Proposition
71 which Gives a little further light on this particular thought.
It is as follows:
"All those characters which in the o:"iginative
causes have higher and more universal rank become
in the resultant beings, through the irradiations
which proceed from them, a kind of substratum for
the glfts of the more specific principles; and
while the irradiations of the superior principles
thus serve as a basis, the characters which proceed from secondary principles are founded upon
them: there is thus an order of precedence in

"participation, and successive rays strike dOwnwards upon the same recipient, the more universal
causes affecting it first, and the more specific .'
supplementing these by the bestowal of their own
gifts upon the participants. n84
When this proposition is compared with the scheme of Dodds, "Thic}
is based in Propositions 14 to 20,95 it is found that it is
practically the same thing.

There th~ tne was the cause of

,everything from pure being to unformed matter and each successivE

•

order of being became a successive undergirding to the other
•

orders.

It is a sort of succession of irradiations.

The last

)1

'one the UA? is caused only by the One and its essence is com-prised of an element of unity alone.

It is simple by virtue of

lying at the other extreme of the order from the One and has no
form whatever.

Each successive order of being by the virtue of

participation has some element of the one above it and in its
reversion follows these successive elements or orders.

There

is both a like and an unlike in each intermediate order between
the two extremes.

The two extremes have one element of likeness.

This does not mean, however, that the
identical.

,...

)J

I

U~1

and the One are
/1

It simply means that all the essence that the U~1

has is simplicity or unity but in the least possible quality or
quantity.

It is, of course, infinitely inferior to the One but

has no other unity except a miminal unity.

Each successive,step

in participation forms a basis for the bestowal of subordinate
gifts.
Much has been said in the above pages on participation
and yet one feels that he has not a strong grip upon the thought.

There seems to be something elusive that can't be tacked down.
Proclus . seems to leave us dissatisfied.

The reason will.·be

somewhat understood from the next chapter in 'Nhich an evaluation
of his doctrine will be attempted.

.e'

CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
Any evaluation of the doctrines of Proclus must accredit him with a definite attempt to interpret the universe
on a spiritual basis.

His philosophy was a real rebuke, if

not a refutation of the Stoics and Epiqpreans whose doctrine
developed after Plato and Aristotle.

Although Proclus was

headed in the right direction, he certainly was not warranted
in gOing to the extreme which he did in his regress.

He is

more culpable than his illustrious predecessors; namely,
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, because the Christian revelation had been brought to his notice.
• 'I

l~.,

I maintain

~his

on the

basis that he surely knew of Porphyry and it was he who wrote
a diatribe against Christianity_

It is thought by some, and

I share the opinion, that the systematic and studied silence
of Proclus in regard to Christianity was a deliberate attempt
to show his contempt for it.

His thinned-out One, which at

times is almost everything and at other times on the brink of
nothing except unity, naked and bare, is in nowise philosophically comparable to the Creator-God of the Christian
revelation.

The above mentioned predecessors of Proclus are

to be excused because they lived without a knowledge of the
__C_h_r_i_s_t_i_an
__r_e_v_e_l_a_t_i_o_n____p_r_o_c_l_U_s_unm
__i_s_t_ak_a_b_l_y_h_a_d
__s_U_C_h_kn_O_W_l_e_d_g_e_•..,!
His God or the One is but a logical entity. It was

unnecessary that he should go beyond Pure Being which is at the
same time pure act in his regress.

He makes unity to be the
4(

producing cause of being while even according to logic being
should be first.

Existence or being must necessarily be

posited as a residence for unity which should only be an attribute.

Proclus thought that he mU$tnarrive at Pure Unity or

the One in order to fulfill his psychological scheme.

Yet,

had he looked more closely into his microcosm he would have

.

found that the hierarchical steps in epistomology are not separated entities which indicate orders of being in the cosmos,
but that all of these functions belong to one human being.
Therefore, had he been true even to his own system, he would
necessarily have come to the conclusion that the One or God
should be a being of pure act to whom the exercise of intelligence, power, and providence could be attributed.

It is for

this reason that I say that his One was only a logical entity.
One of the weaknesses of his philosophy was' the fact that he ~
endeavored to saddle on to the cosmos a logical system which
did not fit in all pOints.
Now we must address ourselves to the question, does
the act of participation originate in the lower or the higher·
order of being?

.

Although he attributes the activity of partici

pation to lower orders it is clear that this power to participate is received from the higher.

He tenaciously maintains

that there is nothing in the effect that is not in the cause.
He holds the cause to be perfect and that anything that appears
in the subsequent is an actualized potency which was made

actual by virtue of its having previously been actualized in a
higher order.

Using his same

air~tight

logic

we

.'

are forced to

the conclusion that all lower orders of being have received
their various powers, and even that of participation, from the
higher.

Therefore, the power of participation is vested

finally in the higher order.

Any d:L$t.;i.nctly new element which

the consequent possesses is a gift from the higher.

Even the

appetite to revert back is as it were a constant stream that
flows out

fromh~her

•

to lower and circles back again.

His doctrine of reversion in cycles seems to be
superfluous •. Neither his psychological findings nor the observable facts in nature warrant such a conclusion.

While it

is true that the psychological urge in man never seems to be
fully satisfied, that his capabilities for knowledge seem to
be ever expanding, and that infinity might logically be deduced as his goal, yet'th.is does not justify the reversion
doctrine to the extreme

extent that Proclus held it.

was a mistaken teleology.
only warrant the conclusion

His

The observable facts in nature
that there is an intrinsic design

and purpose in the universe and that all things are working
naturally toward their proper end.

This proper end is that

they reach their full productivity and enjoyment, and
perpetuate their species or kind.

als~

To argue that each order

of being must revert back to a higher order, etc., etc., may
be done in the realm of pure logiC but it does not fit in the
realm of the observable universe.
Proclus. on the other hand, made a valuable

contribution to metaphysics and, of course, as has already

.'

been said, he blazed the trail more clearly than his predecessors for the spiritual interpretation of the universe.

His

contribution to the immateriality of the soul and to the existence of the intelligible world is beyond estimate.
influenced many of the middle age
is readily admitted by all.

p~lPsophers

That he

and theologians

The extent of this influence is

,.

reserved for a later thesis on this same general subject but
with much wider scope.

His doctrines of simple essences, the undiminished
giver, cause and effect, evil as an absence of good, design
and providence in the universe, as well as his doctrine of
emanence, are in the main acceptable by Christian philosophers.
His doctrine of transcendence is sadly lacking when compared
with the Christian Scholastic philosophy and theology.
Finally, what is participation according to Proclus?
It is the impartation by a higher order of being of something~
of its own likeness, without diminution to itself, to a lower
order and at the same time a gift to this lower order of a new
element.

This new element in turn can be imparted to a still

lower order.

All that is imparted remains in a larger degree,

or more perfectly, in the higher.

The lower order,

howev~r,

by

virtue of this impartation from the higher, is said to participate in the higher to the degree that it has received from it
by impartation.
In taking leave of Proclus I should like to say that
his metaphYsical voice is like a prophet crying in the

wilderness of present day hyper-specialization which deals only
with parts.

Proclus is calling us back and urging that"'we fit

the parts into the whole.

He was at least brave and consistent

enough to attempt a philosophic system which would include all
the facts which in his estimation were worthy of a place in the
cosmic scheme.

....

He did well, contributed much and at least laid

a few stones in the foundation upon which it was st. Thomas'
glory to build the temple of true philisophy.
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